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Abstract— Critical real-time embedded systems need to make use 
of fault tolerance techniques to cope with operation time errors, 
either in hardware or software. Fault tolerance is usually applied 
by means of redundancy and diversity. Redundant hardware 
implies the establishment of a distributed system executing a set 
of fault tolerance strategies by software, and may also employ 
some form of diversity, by using different variants or versions for 
the same processing.  
This work proposes and evaluates a fault tolerance framework 
for supporting the development of dependable applications. This 
framework is build upon basic operating system services and 
middleware communications and brings flexible and transparent 
support for application threads. A case study involving radar 
filtering is described and the framework advantages and 
drawbacks are discussed. 
Keywords: Real-time systems; Fault tolerance. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Real-time embedded systems are applied in several safety-
critical domains as aerospace, automotive and industrial. In 
these applications, high dependability [1] must be a goal in the 
system design. Dependability involves several attributes like 
reliability, availability and safety, and may be achieved with 
fault prevention and removal at design and implementation 
phases. However, hardware faults, either permanent or transient 
ones, and residual software faults, may happen during system 
operation. Therefore, fault tolerance (FT) must be considered in 
system design, to prevent faults from becoming system failures. 
Fault tolerance is usually applied by means of redundancy 
and diversity. Redundant hardware involves extra software 
coordination, which makes the software system more complex 
and prone to errors. Software fault tolerance may be 
implemented by software re-execution or multiple versions 
techniques, which also requires the application of additional 
control mechanisms. 
Generally a real-time system executes a series of tasks 
subjected to deadlines and jitter constraints. For many of these 
applications, there are serious limitations in physical size and 
energy consumption, which imply reduced processing power 
and memory size. 
The contribution of this work is the proposal and evaluation 
of a framework for developing real-time embedded fault- 
tolerant software. In contrast with previous works, we target 
the application thread level, based on a thread model 
commonly used for embedded systems software development. 
Our approach is to provide support for the implementation 
of a wide variety of fault tolerance strategies at the application 
level with maximum transparency. For this reason, an FT 
framework was developed and integrated to a real-time 
embedded operating system (BOSS). The proposed framework 
was evaluated in terms of flexibility and performance in a case 
study involving radar filtering. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the 
fault tolerance mechanisms applied in this work. Section III 
makes a brief description of the BOSS operating system. 
Section IV presents our thread model and describes the FT 
framework application. Section V describes the implementation 
of the framework. Section VI presents the case study and its 
results. Section VII evaluates the framework. Section VIII 
contains the related work, and Section IX concludes this paper. 
II. FAULT TOLERANCE CONCEPTS 
Fault tolerance is a means of achieving a continuous system 
service in the presence of active faults [1]. Several FT 
strategies have been proposed and applied in the last 30 years. 
Some strategies are based on single version software, and can 
only be effective with hardware faults and transient software 
faults. One example is Rollback/Retry, also called “checkpoint 
and restart” [2]. In this strategy the detection of an error 
triggers a system rollback to a previously saved state and a re-
execution of the same processing. This technique is based on 
backward error recovery and needs an efficient error detection 
mechanism. Other strategies apply hardware redundancy to 
detect and mask errors, as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
[3], in which error detection is performed by comparison of the 
results of multiple hardware/software units.   
In order to deal with permanent software faults, multiple 
version software (software diversity) is needed. Several 
strategies have been proposed as Recovery Blocks (RB) [4], 
Distributed Recovery Blocks (DRB) [5] and N-Version 
Programming (NVP) [6]. 
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RB and DRB perform backward error recovery like Roll-
back/Retry, but use different software versions, or variants, in 
each execution block. The main difference between RB and 
DRB is the distributed nature of the latter, which allows 
concurrent execution of variants in two distinct nodes and 
coordination between them to define what node will send the 
final output. 
NVP is a FT strategy that uses forward error recovery in 
which multiple variants (at least 3) run sequentially or 
concurrently. A decision mechanism selects the correct 
response usually by majority voting. In a multi-computer 
system, each variant runs in a different node and the decision 
mechanism (voter) may be replicated too.  
In this work, RB, DRB and NVP strategies are supported, 
as well as single version techniques related to them, as Roll-
back/Retry, Pair of Self-Checking Processors (PSP) [7] and 
TMR. 
III. BOSS OPERATING SYSTEM 
BOSS is a real-time operating system developed by FHG-
FIRST. The BIRD (Bi-Spectral Infrared Detection) satellite [8], 
designed for early detection of fires, uses BOSS as its multiple-
computer control operating system. BOSS has also been 
applied in several other projects, and future utilizations include 
CubeSat satellites [9] and robotics in space [10]. 
BOSS design has been driven by reducing software 
complexity as a means to achieving dependability, as 
complexity is the cause of most development faults. The 
system had several parts validated by formal verification. It 
was developed using object-oriented programming with C++ 
and it has been ported to several platforms as PowerPC, x86 
and Atmel AVR. There is also available an on-top-of Linux 
porting, primarily used for early testing.  
BOSS supports fault tolerance in hardware redundant 
systems, by including a middleware layer which carries out 
transparent communications between nodes, using the 
publisher-subscriber protocol. A message object can be sent 
locally or to the network, using a string as message subject. 
Receiving messages must specify which subject they are 
expected to receive from. Threads are usually consumers of 
receiving messages, by attaching to mail box objects. The 
middleware also supports message marshaling and the 
elimination of duplicate messages, based on a message 
identification number. 
IV. FAULT TOLERANCE FRAMEWORK 
This Section describes our thread model, the basic features 
of the tolerance framework which was integrated to the BOSS 
operating system to support application level fault tolerance, 
and how this framework is applied. 
Fault tolerance can be applied to several layers of software, 
as at the operating system level, function/method level, object 
level or process level. Our work applies FT techniques to the 
thread level, but targeting only application threads, as operating 
system threads are supposed to be more robust.  
Our purpose is presenting a general description of the 
framework fault tolerance capacities and how they are 
employed by the application programs. 
A. Thread Model 
Figure 1 shows the thread model required for fault-tolerant 
threads.  The thread to be made fault-tolerant runs in an infinite 
loop, reading from input devices or receiving input messages 
from other threads. After processing the inputs, an output is 
generated either by writing to an output device or sending a 
result message to other threads. The model supports both state 
threads and stateless threads. For state threads, the output result 
will depend both on the input data and on the previous state 
data. 
An example of a candidate thread for fault tolerance 
implementation is presented in Figure 2. 
 
class ExampleThread : public Thread { 
  
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20>  
                            incommingMessages; 
public: 
  ExampleThread(){ ... // init code} 
    
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = incommingMessages.receive(); 
      process(); 
      output(); 
    } 
  } 
 
  void process(){ 
    ... // uses msg data and state data 
  } 
 
  void output(){ 
    ... // prepares output message 
    outMsg.send("exampleResult"); 




Figure 2. Example of application thread. 
In BOSS, all application threads must inherit from the 
Thread class and implement the run virtual function, which 
defines the thread run-time behavior. In this example, 
 
Figure 1. Thread model. 
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ExampleThread runs cyclically, reading messages from an 
IncommingMessageAdministrator object, which consists of a 
mailbox for messages of the Msg class. The process method is 
executed next, and implements some computing algorithm 
using data from the incoming message and possibly from an 
internal state (attributes not shown). Finally the output method 
prepares the output message and sends it locally and over the 
network, using the string exampleResult as subject. The 
instantiation of thread objects is normally static, as shown in 
the last line of Figure 2. Dynamic memory allocation is 
normally avoided for performance reasons. 
B. Framework description 
A simplified FT framework class diagram is shown in 
Figure 3. A fault-tolerant thread must inherit from the 
FTThread class and must define an FTStrategy object that will 
implement the fault tolerance functionality. Presently, three FT 
strategies have been implemented: RB, DRB and NVP, but 
others can be developed and integrated to the framework. The 
FTThread class declares several virtual functions which must 
be defined by the FT application thread, depending on the 
selected FT strategy. 
VoterThread is a class designed to support the development 
of voters, as required in the NVP strategy. A voter thread must 
inherit from VoterThread and define some virtual functions, 
such as findEqualSolution. A standard voter class (StdVoter) is 
supplied. This class provides exact voting when both inputs 
and outputs depend on message passing.  
The MiddlewareScheduler (MS) class controls all FT and 
voter threads. This thread periodically searches for active 
FT/voter threads and executes part of the required control logic. 
Besides, this thread triggers periodic middleware messages for 
executing role definitions and thread state synchronization. 
The modifications required to make an application thread 
fault-tolerant include: 
• Instantiation and registration of an FTStrategy object 
that will implement the desired fault tolerance strategy, 
as RB, DRB and NVP. 
• Execution of the executeFT method of the FTStrategy 
object after the thread activation. 
• Implementation of application specific methods related 
to the selected fault tolerance strategy (as the 
acceptance test in RB and DRB). Some of them consist 
of new functionality but others will contain the code 
originally defined in the processing and output 
methods. 
Figure 4 shows an example of fault-tolerant implementation 
for ExampleThread of Figure 2, using the DRB strategy. The 
main differences between this version and the original code in 
Figure 2 are highlighted. The thread itself now inherits from 
the FTThread class, instead of the Thread class. A concrete 
FTStrategy is instantiated as a DRBStrategy (myDRB). In the 
class constructor, the maximum response time for execution is 
set to 20,000 microseconds and the setFTStrategy method is 
called, assigning the address of the DRBSstrategy to the 
ftStrategy pointer. In the run method, the original process and 
output methods are replaced by a call to the executeFT method 
of the FTStrategy class. This method is responsible for 
executing the particular strategy and for activating the 
application specific methods defined in the application thread, 
as for example, variant1 (primary block) and acceptanceTest. 
Some of these methods correspond to original 
implementations, but others, like variant2 (recovery block) and 
saveCheckpoint should be defined to allow the DRB strategy 
operation. 
In this example, ExampleThread is stateless; otherwise 
FTExampleThread should also implement the methods getState 
and setState, to provide state initialization between the primary 
and the shadow nodes in DRB. None of these methods are 
necessary in the original version, as only one ExampleThread 
instance runs in a single node. 
 
 
Figure 3. FT framework class diagram. 
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class FTExampleThread : public FTThread { 
   
  DRBStrategy myDRB; 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20> 
                             incommingMessages; 
public: 
 
  FTExampleThread(){ 
    ... // init code 
    myDRB.setMaxResponseTime(20000);  
    setFTStrategy(&myDRB); 
  } 
 
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = incommingMessages.receive(); 
      ftStrategy->executeFT();  
    } 
  } 
 
  void variant1(){ 
    ... // same code of original process method  
  } 
 
  void sendResult(){ 
    ... // same code of original output method 
  } 
  // to be defined 
  void variant2(){ ...} 
  void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  void restoreCheckpoint(){...} 
  bool acceptanceTest(){...} 
}; 
Figure 4. Example of FT application thread. 
C. Application Specific Entities 
Each FT strategy instantiation and usage demands the 
definition of strategy attributes and application specific 
behavior. These requirements are summarized in Tables I, II 
and III. Table I represents requirements for multiple version 
software, Table II for single version software and Table III for 
voters. 
The fault tolerance strategies in Table II use the same 
FTStrategy objects of RB, DRB and NVP, but do not 
implement their full functionality, as several methods don’t 
need to be defined. In these cases they inherit a default 
implementation. For example, the default implementation for 
save/restoreCheckpoint is empty and for acceptanceTest is to 
return true (success). 
The simplest FT strategy in Table II is the Restart strategy. 
In this technique only one variant is defined, and the 
acceptance test is not implemented. Therefore, the only 
possible error detection mechanism is deadline expiration, 
which is set by the Response Time parameter. Rollback/Retry 
can be implemented as single version simplification of the RB 
strategy. In this case, only one real variant is defined, and the 
body of variant2 should contain a call to the variant1 method. 
In a similar way, PSP is implemented with the DRB strategy 
and TMR with the NVP strategy.   
TABLE I.  MULTIPLE VERSION STRATEGIES REQUIREMENTS. 
 
TABLE II.  SINGLE VERSION STRATEGIES REQUIREMENTS. 
 
TABLE III.  VOTER REQUIREMENTS 
 
The onFailure method in Tables I and II is always optional. 
It can be used to define application dependent fault handling 
mechanisms when a failure in the strategy execution occurs. 
After running the code defined in the onFailure method, the 
thread will be restarted by the operating system.  
Table III displays the requirements for voting threads. 
These threads are only needed when using TMR or NVP. In the 
general case, a voter is application specific and this thread must 
implement the VoterThread methods shown in Table III. 
However, for exact majority voting using messages, a StdVoter 
class which compares results byte by byte may be used. Using 
this standard voter, some other parameters must be defined, as 
the subject of the input and output messages. The coordination 
method parameter defines if all replica voters will execute the 
sendResult method or if only a master voter will do it. The 
definition of the master voter in a coordinated voting is 
performed by the FT framework. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION 
The MiddlewareScheduler (MS) thread runs at the 
beginning of every clock tick interval (e.g. 1ms) and controls 
the behavior and execution of each FT thread and voter. 
Besides, this thread is also responsible for activating other 
middleware threads, as the one that delivers external incoming 
messages.  
Figure 5 shows an example of the execution of a RB thread. 
The MS thread runs periodically and releases message 
reception each two activation periods. The message reception is 
not executed in every cycle in order to reduce CPU utilization 
and to provide at least one period in two for FT threads free 
execution. In the first cycle, the RB thread receives a message 
and starts the FT execution. This example shows a failure in the 
primary block and a success in the recovery block.  
Figure 6 contains an activity diagram showing the 
interaction between the FT Thread and the 
MiddlewareScheduler thread in the execution of the RB 
strategy. After setting up a deadline for execution, based on the 
actual time and the maximum allowed response time, the 
thread suspends. In subsequent MS activations, this thread 
verifies if the deadline has expired and, in that case, restarts the 
RB thread. This represents a failure in delivering the correct 
response on time, but after restarting, the RB thread is ready 
again for receiving the next request or activation. If the 
deadline has not expired, the MS thread commands the next 
actions to be performed by the RB thread and schedules it for 
execution. After executing the right operations (save/restore 
state, run primary/recovery block, run acceptance test) the RB 
thread suspends again and the MS thread checks the acceptance 
test (AT) result. If the RB thread succeeds in AT, the MS 
thread allows it to send the results and the interaction finishes. 
If the RB thread fails in both blocks it is restarted by the MS 
thread. 
The control algorithm of an FT Strategy is executed in two 
separate threads: the FT thread and the MiddlewareScheduler 
thread.  However, all this code is defined by the FTStrategy 
concrete class. As seen in the class diagram of Figure 7, every 
FTStrategy must implement the executeFT method, which 
corresponds to the FT thread execution code, and the 
executeMSControl method, which is called by the MS. 
Using this approach, the MiddlewareScheduler does not 
depend on any FT Strategy implementation, and FT strategies 
can be added to the framework transparently. 
In contrast with the RB strategy presented so far, other FT 
strategies involve the utilization of multiples instances of the 
FT thread, running in different nodes. These FT threads have to 
communicate in order to establish roles and initialize states. In 
this framework, the required communication between FT 
threads is executed by message passing between the 
MiddlewareScheduler threads of each node. If an FT thread 
needs to send a message it calls the sendMiddlewareMessage 
method of MS.  Then, the message is broadcasted to all other 
nodes and their MS threads will distribute it to the related FT 
threads in their nodes, if any, by calling the 
processMiddlewareMessage method of the corresponding FT 
strategy.  
Another feature performed by MiddlewareScheduler is the 
activation of FTStrategies periodically (e.g. 300ms) in order to 
trigger the execution of periodic tasks as, for instance, role 
conflicts detection in the DRB strategy. In that case, the 
startPeriodicMsg of FTStrategy is called.    
Finally, the MiddlewareScheduler thread is responsible for 
changing the FT threads priorities according to the Earliest 
Deadline First (EDF) scheduling. Therefore, in each MS 
activation the FT thread with earliest deadline is found and its 
priority is raised to a maximum among application threads. 
This feature can be enabled or disabled in the framework. 
The MS thread also controls VoterThreads execution, in a 
similar way of the control of FT Threads. However, the MS 
control is simpler, as only detects if the voting deadline has 
elapsed. The algorithm implemented in VoterThread uses 
single match voting. Upon receiving a solution message, the 
voter thread compares the solution with the previous ones just 
 
Figure 5. RB execution timing example. 
 
Figure 6. RB execution activity diagram.  
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received and if a match is found (findEqualSolution method) it 
is considered as correct and the output is immediately sent. In 
this case, further messages are discarded. If only one solution 
message arrives and the deadline occurs, this solution is also 
considered correct and it is sent as the output.  For the 
implementation of voting, it is required sequential message 
identification, already supported by the middleware. Voter 
threads can also send and receive middleware messages for 
establishing the role in coordinated voting (Master or Slave). 
VI. CASE STUDY: RADAR FILTERING SYSTEM 
We applied this FT framework in the development of a 
radar filtering system. This setup is composed of a portable PC 
and three PowerPC 823 boards connected by an Ethernet 
network. The portable PC runs an application, using an on-top-
of-Linux implementation of BOSS, which simulates a radar 
system, generating detection data of several planes 
periodically. The data generation includes simulated errors in 
bearing and distance, typical of this kind of equipment. This 
data is received by the PowerPC 823 boards running a BOSS 
application that filters the planes’ position, using an alpha-beta 
filter, and also calculates the planes’ course and speed. The 
results are sent back to the portable PC, where they are 
displayed by a Java GUI program in Linux. 
Three basic configurations are applied, as shown by the 
UML deployment diagrams of Figures 8, 9 and 10. The first 
configuration uses a single node version of the filtering 
application, without any fault tolerance mechanism. The other 
configurations implement the PSP and TMR strategies.  In 
these figures, broadcast messages are represented by buses with 
the message subject on top. The Radar thread in the PC always 
sends its data using radar_data as subject. Similarly, the final 
result data from the PowerPC boards are sent to the Display 
with filter_data as subject. For the PSP configuration in Figure 
9, both Filter threads receive the radar data and execute the 
computation, but only the primary thread sends its results. In 
the TMR configuration of Figure 10, all Filter threads send 
their results with unvoted_data as subject, which are received 
by the voter threads. In this particular configuration, 
coordinated voting is used and so only the master voter thread 
sends the final results to the Display thread. Messages between 
FT threads and voters are sent with FTStatus as subject as 
shown in Figure 9 (omitted in Figure 10). Figure 11 presents an 
example of display output for the TMR configuration.  
In FT configurations, hardware faults were simulated by 
turning PowerPC boards off and software faults were simulated 
by introducing value errors in the filter calculation.  In the PSP 
configuration, a hardware fault in a board running as primary 
causes a switch to primary in the other node. A software fault is 
detected by the acceptance test, and a rollback and retry is 
performed with the same algorithm. If the simulated fault is 
still present, the PSP thread will restart. For the TMR 
configuration, a hardware fault in the board with the master 
voter will imply in a new master voter board after the next 
master election. A software fault in one of the boards will be 
masked by the voter mechanism. 
If a board is initialized, or if an FT thread is restarted, a 
state initialization is needed, as the filter output depends on the 
 
Figure 7. FTStrategy execution methods. 
 
Figure 8. Non-FT configuration 
 
Figure 10  TMR configuration. 
 
Figure 9. PSP configuration 
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planes’ last position and alpha-beta parameters. This 
initialization algorithm is performed by the corresponding 
FTStrategy object, transparently to the application program, 
which has only to define the getState and setState methods. 
A. Performance 
The radar simulation periodically sends planes´ data every 
2 seconds. This corresponds to the rotation period of the radar 
antenna. To test the system under more severe timing 
conditions and compare the performance of the FT 
configurations we varied the radar simulation period, reducing 
it by factors of two. Figure 12 shows performance results in 
terms of CPU utilization for several configurations and 
simulation frequencies varying form 0.5 Hz (2 seconds) to 32 
Hz (31.25 ms). 
The curves labeled “Non-FT” are related to the non-fault 
tolerant single node version shown in Figure 8. The “Non-FT 
#1” setup employed an operating system version with no FT 
framework, while in #2 the FT framework was integrated. We 
can notice that the utilization of the FT framework implies a 
performance cost of about 3%. This difference is due to the 
periodic activation of the MiddllewareScheduler thread in 
addition to the operating system scheduler.  
The PSP and TMR configurations present poorer 
performance than non-FT configurations as expected. The 
reason is the extra processing time associated with the FT 
control, application specific procedures and message 
communication. The TMR configuration achieved the worst 
results as it demands more threads for voting and more 
message exchanges.  
We conclude that the performance cost of fault tolerance 
implementation is still acceptable, considering the benefits in 
system reliability. However, for systems already demanding 
high CPU utilization, the introduction of fault tolerance might 
be a problem, and special care must be taken, including in the 
selection of the FT strategy. 
VII. EVALUATION 
The utilization of a FT framework in the development of 
embedded fault-tolerant systems has several benefits: 
• Simplifies the application level programming, as 
programs don’t have to implement fault tolerance 
mechanisms, and only have to provide application 
specific parameters and procedures. 
• The application program follows a standard structure in 
which changing the FT strategy becomes easy and 
straightforward.  This reduces efforts in strategy 
selection, configuration and testing. 
• Facilitates the creation and integration of new fault 
tolerance strategies. The proposed framework is easily 
extendable by adding new FTStrategy and 
VoterThread derived classes.  
• Provides a means of implementing adaptive fault 
tolerance [11], as changing the FT strategy can be 
performed at run-time by simply calling the setStrategy 
method. The strategy can be modified based on the 
reliability requirements of each the mission phase, or 
even for other factors as resource availability and 
power consumption. 
 An addition benefit of this framework is that it makes easy 
to modularize all fault-tolerant code using Aspect Oriented 
Programming (AOP) [12]. This framework has been applied in 
[13] to provide a full separation between the application 
functionality and the fault tolerance concern.  
The drawbacks of the FT framework are not related with 
the framework itself but with the fault tolerance domain. This 
includes the usage of more physical resources and, for each 
system node, more run-time overhead and memory 
consumption. 
VIII. RELATED WORK 
Several patterns and frameworks for fault tolerance design 
using object-oriented approaches have been proposed in the last 
 
Figure 12. Performance results. 
 
Figure 11. Display example. 
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ten years [15][16][17][18]. In all them, concepts as 
checkpointing, try-blocks, acceptance tests, versions and voters 
are represented by classes. Each proposal has its own class 
structure, using abstract classes to represent more general 
concepts as variants and adjudicators. Some common patterns 
are used in these frameworks, like the composite pattern [14] as 
in [17] and [18].  In general, these proposals do not address 
thread models and distributed architectures.  
Few implementations of fault tolerance support by the 
operating system or by a middleware were found. 
FT-RT-Mach, an academic general purpose operating 
systems, and the DEOS operating system, a certified operating 
system for critical avionics applications, use re-execution of 
tasks as the primary method for achieving fault tolerance [19]. 
In these systems, an error can be detected either by an 
acceptance test or any other exception, and the operating 
system scheduler tries to guarantee the rescheduling of the 
thread before its deadline.  
ROAFTS (Real-Time Object-Oriented Adaptive Fault 
Tolerant Support) is a middleware architecture that can support 
several strategies of fault tolerance, like RB and DRB, and 
dynamically switches the units operating mode in response to 
changes in the resource and application modes [20]. This 
middleware is applied as a component of the TMO (Time-
triggered Message-triggered Object structuring scheme) model 
of computation [21] where the basic units of computation are 
time-triggered and service methods of real-time distributed 
objects.  
Despite having the same goal of this work, the systems 
described target large-scale critical systems, and do not fit into 
embedded systems applications because of its intense resource 
utilization and complexity. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a framework for supporting the 
development of application-level fault tolerance for real-time 
embedded systems. The framework already implements a wide 
set of FT mechanisms and extending the framework is 
considered very simple. Other advantages include easiness of 
configuration and high flexibility both at compile and run-time. 
Additionally, a case study using radar filtering was 
presented and the performance of several configurations were 
measured and compared. The extra costs involved with the 
introduction of FT mechanisms are considered acceptable for 
systems demanding high dependability. 
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